Western New England Law Review
Volume 36 36 (2014)
Issue 1

Article 3

2014

ENERGY LAW—NOT BALANCING WELL
INTERESTS WELL: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MISMANAGED
OIL AND GAS LEASE POLICY IN T.W.
PHILLIPS GAS &OIL CO. V. JEDLICKA
Joseph R. Plukas

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Joseph R. Plukas, ENERGY LAW—NOT BALANCING WELL INTERESTS WELL: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA MISMANAGED OIL AND GAS LEASE POLICY IN T.W. PHILLIPS GAS &OIL CO. V. JEDLICKA, 36 W. New
Eng. L. Rev. 68 (2014), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss1/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

ENERGY LAW—NOT BALANCING WELL INTERESTS WELL: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MISMANAGED OIL AND GAS
LEASE POLICY IN T.W. PHILLIPS GAS & OIL CO. V. JEDLICKA
INTRODUCTION
A.

The Real-Life Implications and Interests at Stake in Litigation Over
the Proper Interpretation of In Paying Quantities

The interests at odds in oil and gas lease law are several and
intricate. To better understand the sundry perspectives, I offer a
hypothetical: envision Will, a college graduate from a small farming
community in north-central Pennsylvania. 1 After months of looking for
work after graduation, Will found a position as a “landsman” 2 for GoodFaith Oil and Gas Co. Will has been extremely successful working for
Good-Faith because he empathizes with the hardships facing the farming
communities he negotiates with.
Now picture Jim, a farmer with two-hundred acres of
underperforming corn, wheat, and pumpkin fields. Until the local coalplant closed two years ago, Jim worked in the coal industry to subsidize
his meager income. Afraid of losing his family farm, Jim was looking
for any opportunity available to make extra money.
By lucky coincidence, Will and Jim met. Will brought the
standard-form lease he gives to landowners to sign when he believes
Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. would benefit from the property. The lease
provides the usual wording, including the term of the lease being set for
five years “and as long thereafter as oil or gas . . . are produced in paying
quantities.” 3 Such language is standard for a habendum clause 4 in oil
and gas leases. Most lessors do not question Will when he reads the

1. This hypothetical bares some inspiration from the movie Promised Land written by
and starring Matt Damon and John Krasinski. PROMISED LAND, FOCUS FEATURES,
http://www.focusfeatures.com/promised_land (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
2. David Levdansky, Oil and Gas Leases: A Guide for Pennsylvania Landowners, PA
HOUSE, http://www.pahouse.com/pr/039-Leasing_NL.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) (using
industry jargon to describe an employee for an oil and gas company who negotiates leases
with landowners).
3. See, e.g., Multi-State Lease Form, KANES FORMS, http://kanesforms.com/formsprograms/sample-forms-field-landman.html (follow “Pennsylvania Rental” hyperlink) (last
visited Feb. 16, 2014). In paying quantities is the pseudo-ambiguous phrase, the meaning of
which is discussed in this Note.
4. See generally JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUT SHELL 191 (4th ed. 2003)
(“The habendum clause of an oil and gas lease, sometimes called the ‘term’ clause, sets the
period of time for which the rights given in the granting clause will extend.”).
Modern lease habendum clauses provide for a primary term and a secondary term.
The primary term of an oil and gas lease is a fixed term of years during which the
lessee has the right, without any obligation, to operate on the premises. The
secondary term is the extended period of time for which rights are granted to the
lessee once production is obtained.
Id.
68
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lease to them. After all, Will explains to the landowners how much
money they stand to make in the lease and the landowner,
understandably, wants the money to come in for as long as possible.
Will explained to Jim that Good-Faith could offer him five dollars an
acre-per-year rental fee plus a one-eighth royalty fee on all oil and gas
produced from his land. 5
Two years after signing, no drilling, or oil or gas production had
occurred on Jim’s land. While he had not received any royalty
payments, the rental fee alone helped him keep his farm out of the
bank’s hands. In the third year of the definite term of the lease, GoodFaith drilled four traditional oil and gas wells. Further, the company was
able to produce a significant amount of natural gas in the first five years
of drilling, providing Jim with nearly two million dollars in royalty
payments. Jim was thrilled with the money, going from a down-on-hisluck farmer to an affluent landowner. With the new money, Jim was
able to fulfill his dream of buying dairy cows to show in competitions.
After ten years, the wells on Jim’s land slowed in production,
prompting Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. to fracture the wells to boost
output. Jim was unhappy about the hydraulic fracturing. He had grown
skeptical about the unknown effects that the chemicals in the hydraulic
solutions may have on his farm. The fracturing continued, apparently,
without incident.
Unfortunately, Jim’s prized show cow died after drinking water
from a field near the farm’s fractured sites. 6 Jim is not positive, but he
believes his cow died from drinking a chemical in the fracturing solution
on his land. Compounding disappointment, the fourteenth year of
production was an unsuccessful one for Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co.,
failing to produce a profit over their operating expenses. After the first
half of the fifteenth year, and an eighteen-month net loss, Good-Faith
Oil and Gas Co. wanted to re-fracture the wells on Jim’s land and drill
two new wells. Jim—fearing for the lives of his show cows—opposed
5. 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 33 (West 1979) (repealed 2013) (“A lease or other such
agreement conveying the right to remove or recover oil, natural gas or gas of any other
designation from lessor to lessee shall not be valid if such lease does not guarantee the lessor
at lease [sic] one-eighth royalty of all oil, natural gas or gas of other designations removed or
recovered from the subject real property.”). The numbers used in the hypothetical are strictly
fictitious but do represent an accurate example of the profit potential in a large tract of land in
rural Pennsylvania. See generally Oil and Gas Investing FAQ, BLACKBEARD DATA
SERVICES, http://blackbearddata.com/oil-and-gas-royalties-what-they-are (last visited Feb. 16,
2014).
6. See Barry Estabrook, Fracking with Our Food: How Gas Drilling Affects Farming,
GRIST (May 20, 2011, 12:48 AM), http://grist.org/natural-gas/2011-05-19-fracking-with-ourfood-how-gas-drilling-affects-farming/ (telling the story of Ken Jaffe, a cattle farmer from the
Catskills in New York, with much hyperbole and fear mongering against “fracking”).
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the most recent hydraulic fracturing. He filed an injunction and an
action to quiet title against Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. Alleging the
lease terminated after the fourteenth year’s failure to produce oil and gas
in paying quantities, Jim believes Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. no longer
has a right to produce oil and gas on his land.
Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. believed the lease was still in effect
because there were several successful months within the generally
unprofitable last eighteen months. They argue the land was producing
marginally, and the lease, therefore, continues based only on their own
subjective good faith. There is no evidence indicating that Good-Faith is
holding Jim’s lease just for speculation. Further, Good-Faith alleges Jim
only wants out of the original lease so he can renegotiate a higher rental
fee to support his new lavish lifestyle.
The jurisdiction that such a hypothetical is heard in may be
determinative of the outcome. The hypothetical interests at odds must
all be properly factored into decisions relating to oil and gas law in
Pennsylvania. 7 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania failed to properly
value the landowners’ interests in favor of protecting those of the oil and
gas industry in the majority opinion of T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v.
Jedlicka. 8 The imbalance will be shown through the lens of Jim versus
Good-Faith.
In 2012, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania endeavored to bring
the 1899 decision in Young v Forest Oil Co.9 into the twenty-first
century via T.W. Phillips Oil & Gas Co. v. Jedlicka. 10 By implementing
the good faith business judgment standard as the criterion for
determining whether an oil and gas lease is producing “in paying
quantities,” the court failed to heed guidance from oil and gas law
developments in other producing states.11 The business judgment
standard states that so long as an oil and gas company subjectively

7. Jim, as the farm owner, and Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co., as the company trying to
extract as much money as possible from the land while employing good people like Will, have
serious interests in the proper handling of oil and gas litigation.
8. 42 A.3d 261, 263 (Pa. 2012). See Dale A. Tice, Opening Pandora's Box? Calling
Shale Gas Rights into Question, THE PA. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2012, at 24, 24 (“As a general rule,
lawyers like predictability and consistency in the law. While there may be instances where
ambiguity can create opportunities for creative lawyering, when it comes to black-letter
property law, uncertainty is anathema for attorneys. This is particularly true when lawyers are
counseling clients regarding property as valuable as Marcellus Shale gas rights.”); see also
State Natural Gas Act, S. 3437, 112th Cong. (as sponsored by Sen. Robert Casey Jr. [D-PA],
referred to committee, July 25, 2012) (promoting natural gas production and development).
9. 45 A. 121 (Pa. 1899). Young was the first case to interpret the meaning of in paying
quantities and has been the key authority on the subject since it was decided. See infra Part. I.
10. 42 A.3d 261 (Pa. 2012).
11. See id. at 276.
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believes that it is continuing production activities for a profit, the lease
will continue. 12 Furthermore, the standard places an excessive burden of
proof on a landowner attempting to terminate a lease due to unprofitable
production. 13 By enforcing such stringent requirements for terminating
a lease, and incorporating a subjective good faith component, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania encourages a significant imbalance
among various interests at odds in oil and gas lease litigation. A test,
like the “reasonably prudent operator standard,” 14 would be more
appropriate for regulating production quantities, and henceforth,
promoting impartiality in assessment of oil and gas lease litigation.15
The reasonably prudent operator standard is utilized in other states,
which have found persuasive value in Young v Forest Oil Co. 16
This Note will examine how courts interpreted the term in paying
quantities prior to Jedlicka. It will further argue that the good faith
business judgment standard was inappropriately included in the test for
determining when an oil and gas lease is producing in paying quantities
and thereby created indefinite terms in oil and gas leases.17 Part I
describes the opinion of Young v. Forest Oil Co., which first decided the
12. Id.
13. Id. at 272 (“[I]n assessing whether a lease is producing in paying quantities, Young
places the principal focus on the good faith judgment of the operator.”).
14. See, e.g., Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959) (“In the case of a
marginal well, such as we have here, the standard by which paying quantities is determined is
whether or not under all the relevant circumstances a reasonably prudent operator would, for
the purpose of making a profit and not merely for speculation, continue to operate a well in
the manner in which the well in question was operated.”).
15. The applicability of the term in paying quantities is imperative because
Pennsylvania has a statutorily mandated minimum royalty clause. 58 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 3334 (West 2012). As all Pennsylvania oil and gas leases must have a royalty clause, the
cessation of production in the indeterminate period of a lease will result in termination. See
Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 793 (W.D. Pa. 2004). “If any
provisions in the lease make the value of the lease increase with production, then the duration
of the lease during the secondary term is to be construed as contingent on production in
paying quantities unless a clear intent to the contrary is expressed in the lease.” Id. (citing
Clark v Wright, 166 A. 775, 776 (Pa. 1935) ("[L]ease obligating lessee to $300 per annum for
each gas well from which gas is marketed made value of lease dependent upon marketing of
gas and properly was interpreted by rules governing royalty-based leases.")).
16. 45 A. 121 (Pa. 1899). See, e.g., Koontz, 325 S.W.2d at 691 (holding if a well
produces a profit over operating expenses it is producing in paying quantities, but in the case
of a marginal well the reasonably prudent operator standard applies).
17. Note that an oil and gas lease subject to an indefinite term such as so "long
thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities,” are in the nature of a fee simple
determinable. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264. Therefore, while the reversionary event may or may
not happen within twenty-one years, a fee simple determinable is not subject to the rule
against perpetuities in Pennsylvania. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b) (West 2006)
(“Upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common law rule against perpetuities as
measured by actual rather than possible events, any interest not then vested and any interest in
members of a class the membership of which is then subject to increase shall be void.”).
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test for determining when a lease was producing in paying quantities.
Part I.B is a case study of the language used in Young through decisions
by other states in developing the reasonably prudent operator standard—
which this Note will argue is the proper test to analyze whether a well is
producing in paying quantities. Part II proposes that the good faith
business judgment standard, imputed by the Jedlicka majority, makes
the indefinite term in a habendum clause nearly impossible to terminate,
creating an unwarranted and unfair balance among the interested parties.
B.

Oil, Gas, and the Importance of Marcellus Shale

Oil and gas leases are integral cogs in transitioning energy from an
untapped resource in the ground to a fuel source heating Americans’
homes during cold winters. Without proper law governing oil and gas
leases the system cannot work efficiently. While renewable energy is
the likely future of the energy field, oil and natural gas are the
champions of the present. 18 The exponential growth of natural gas
production can be seen in Pennsylvania thanks to the improved viability
of Marcellus Shale. 19 The increased production is significantly lowering
the price of natural gas. 20 These lower gas prices benefit homeowners
who rely on natural gas to heat their homes.21 However, a by-product of
the increased abundance of natural gas is an increased number of oil and
gas leases. This increase has, not surprisingly, led to a profusion of

18. Tiffany Hsu, US to Become World’s Largest Oil Producer by 2020, IEA Says, L. A.
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2012, 9:20 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-u.s.-oilproducer-saudi-arabia-iea-20121112,0,6181922.story (“Recently . . . an ‘energy renaissance’
in the U.S. has caused a boost in oil, shale gas and bio-energy production due to new
technologies such as hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. Fuel efficiency has improved in the
transportation sector. The clean energy industry has seen an influx of solar and wind
efforts.”).
19. Horizontal Drilling Boosts Pennsylvania’s Natural Gas Production, U.S ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (May 23, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6390
(“Between 2009 and 2011, Pennsylvania's natural gas production more than quadrupled due to
expanded horizontal drilling combined with hydraulic fracturing.”). Moreover,
[t]he Marcellus Shale gas formation is rich in natural gas resources. It is one of the
largest shale regions in the United States; Marcellus shale and [sic] is estimated to
be the second largest natural gas find in the world. Stretching across New York,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio and Maryland, the United States Geological
Survey (USGS) estimates the formation’s total area to be around 95,000 square
miles, ranging in depth from 4,000 to 8,000 feet. The 400 year-old rock Marcellus
shale formation is estimated to contain more than 410 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas and could supply U.S. consumers’ energy needs for hundreds of years.
Marcellus Shale, ENERGYFROMSHALE (June 30, 2012), http://www.energyfromshale.org/hyd
raulic-fracturing/marcellus-shale-gas#sthash.L2Qx7KYM.dpuf.
20. U.S ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19.
21. Id.
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litigation. 22 Until recently, oil and gas case law has remained stagnant in
Pennsylvania, the first state with an oil well.23 Recent litigation over the
leases in the state will further develop common law in oil and gas’s
original home.
While there are serious environmental concerns, hydraulic
fracturing has significantly advanced drilling potential and gas
production. 24
As a result of the growing use of hydraulic fracturing, natural gas
production in the United States reached 21,577 billion cubic feet in
2010, a level not achieved since a period of high natural gas
production between 1970 and 1974.
Overall, the Energy
Information Administration now projects that the United States
possesses 2,552 trillion cubic feet of potential natural gas resources,
25
enough to supply the United States for approximately 110 years.

Further, the method of hydraulic fracturing requires injecting fluid
solutions into hard-to-reach domestic energy sources “to increase the
permeability of the shale formation so that gas is able to migrate towards
the well.” 26 Of significant economic importance, the development of
natural gas production within the Marcellus Shale formation may
provide “employment gains [to more than] 280 thousand [workers] in
2020.” 27 The myriad interests at stake in oil and gas law must all be
factored into decisions arising out of, and affecting, Marcellus Shale
development.
Oil and gas law in natural-gas-rich Pennsylvania cannot be
discussed without addressing the serious environmental concerns
22. See, e.g., Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 277 (warning of lessees abusing the justice system in
order to renegotiate lease terms).
23. See Ross H. Pifer, Drake Meets Marcellus: A Review of Pennsylvania Case Law
Upon the Sesquicentennial of the United States Oil and Gas Industry, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS &
ENERGY L. 47, 48 (2011) (“Despite early contributions to the national body of oil and gas law,
the development of Pennsylvania oil and gas case law slowed considerably throughout the
twentieth century, reflecting the relative decline of the industry in the state.”).
24. See H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 112TH CONG., CHEMICALS USED IN
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 2 (Minority Staff) (April 2011), available at http://democrats.e
nergycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Hydraulic-Fracturing-Chemicals2011-4-18.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
25. Id.
26. How Hydraulic Fracturing Works, SWARTHMORE C., http://www.swarthmore.edu
/academics/environmental-studies-capstone-/how-hydraulic-fracturing-works.xml (last visited
Feb. 16, 2014).
27. TIMOTHY J. CONSIDINE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW YORK, PENNSYLVANIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA: A REPORT TO THE
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE 33 (2010), available at http://www.api.org/~/media/Fi
les/Policy/Exploration/API-Economic-Impacts-Marcellus-Shale.ashx (last visited Feb. 16,
2014).
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surrounding hydraulic fracturing. Hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” is
the process by which oil and gas companies pump pressurized liquid
solutions into shale formations to free trapped natural gas. 28 The process
has increased the viability of shale formations such as the Marcellus
Shale in Pennsylvania and neighboring states.29 The environmental
impact from hydraulic fracturing is not fully known, but criticisms of
what is known are abundant and popular. 30 The facts oil and gas
companies leave ambiguous about hydraulic fracturing are often the
most worrisome. 31 The House of Representatives Committee on Energy
and Commerce Minority Staff reported,
[i]n many instances, the oil and gas service companies were unable
to provide . . . a complete chemical makeup of the hydraulic
fracturing fluids they used. Between 2005 and 2009, the companies
used 94 million gallons of 279 products that contained at least one
chemical or component that the manufacturers deemed proprietary or
a trade secret. Committee staff requested that these companies
disclose this proprietary information. Although some companies did
provide information about these proprietary fluids, in most cases the
companies stated that they did not have access to proprietary
information about products they purchased “off the shelf” from
chemical suppliers. In these cases, the companies are injecting fluids
32
containing chemicals that they themselves cannot identify.

The impact of hydraulic fracturing on water supplies has also
inspired legislators to propose new laws hoping to limit harmful
consequences. 33 Understandably, anxieties over hydrofracking may
justify a landowner trying to terminate an oil and gas lease. In an effort
to find a way out of such a lease, a landowner may look to a lack of
production on the land as an avenue to get out of a now unfavorable
agreement.
The habendum clause’s inclusion of the term in paying quantities

28. Hydraulic Fracturing-The State of the Science, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV.,
http://www.usgs.gov/solutions/2012_june8.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
29. Id.
30. Even celebrities have taken to the media in order to expound their critiques of the
contentious practice. See, e.g., Alec Baldwin, Fracking: What Cuomo Won’t (or Can’t) Tell
You, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (July 25, 2012, 2:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.co
m/alec-baldwin/fracking-natural-gas_b_1703190.html?utm_hp_ref=homepage (Alec Baldwin
is an outspoken opponent of the fracking industry).
31. See generally H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 24.
32. Id.
33. FRAC Act, S. 587 and H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. (referred to committee, March 15,
2012) (while unlikely to be passed, the “Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of
Chemicals Act of 2011 - Amends the Safe Drinking Water Act to repeal the exemption from
restrictions on underground injection of fluids”).
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requires definition in order for a landowner and oil and gas company to
properly understand the contracts around which they act. Courts in
Pennsylvania and other states have tried to come up with a working
definition of in paying quantities. 34 Pennsylvania has failed to follow
the beneficial guidance of other states.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW SURROUNDING THE PROPER
INTERPRETATION OF WHEN OIL AND GAS IS PRODUCED IN PAYING
QUANTITIES
Analysis of the contractual phrase “in paying quantities” began in
1899 with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s opinion in Young v.
Forest Oil Co. 35 After discussing Young itself, Part I shows how sister
states have utilized the language in Young to interpret “in paying
quantities” to contain both an objective test and, in the case of marginal
wells, a reasonably prudent operator standard. 36 Finally, Part I offers a
brief background to the 2012 Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decision in
T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v. Jedlicka. Understanding the three
opinions in the decision is critical to fathom the complexity of what in
paying quantities means in an oil and gas lease. The majority opinion,
by Justice Todd, the concurring opinion, by Justice Eakin, and the
dissenting opinion, by Justice Saylor, demonstrate the myriad of issues
at stake when trying to calculate what it means for oil and gas to be
produced in paying quantities. 37
A. The Language in Young v. Forest Oil Co. Supports the Application
of Joint Objective and Subjective Test to Determine if Land is
Producing “In Paying Quantities”
The 1899 decision in Young v. Forest Oil Co. provided an early
opportunity for interpreting the term “in paying quantities,” as it relates
to oil and gas leases in the United States.38 The terminology used by the
court lends support to both the proponents of the objective and
subjective tests. For example, the court’s favor of unambiguous plain
language in contracts supports implementing a purely objective test. 39
34. See, e.g., T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261 (Pa. 2012).
35. 45 A. 121 (Pa. 1899).
36. See infra Part. I.B.
37. Ironically, the majority opinion noted that the leases are in the nature of a contract
and must be interpreted based on the plain meaning of the terms, yet three opinions of the
same court provided different meanings. See Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 267.
38. Young, 45 A. at 121-22.
39. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing J.K. Willison v.
Consol. Coal Co., 637 A.2d 979, 982 (Pa. 1994)) (A contract “must be construed in
accordance with the terms of the agreement as manifestly expressed, and [t]he accepted and
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The factual background in Young is an effective example of
litigation over habendum clauses in oil and gas leases. The lessor,
Andrew B. Young, sought declaratory relief for forfeiture of an oil and
gas lease alleging Forest Oil Company failed to develop land in
accordance with the lease provisions. 40 The oil and gas company
developed and successfully produced oil from the western portion of the
Young tract, but only perfunctorily tested the other sections to see if they
too would produce in paying quantities. 41 In deciding whether the
failure to dig wells on the other portions of the land was a fraudulent act
amounting to forfeiture of the lease, the court established the test for
whether an oil and gas lease is producing “in paying quantities.”42
The language of the test, which has also been popularly adopted in
other states, 43 prescribes, “if a well, being down, pays a profit[]—even a
small one, over the operating expenses[]—it is producing in ‘paying
quantities,’ though it may never repay its cost, and the operation as a
whole may result in a loss.” 44 Otherwise stated, the first component of
the Young test operates as a conditional, mathematical test to see if a
well is producing a profit over its operating expenses. The second Young
component is bi-conditional: if and only if, in the case of marginal wells,
a well is producing a profit over operating expenses, a court must decide
whether a reasonably prudent operator would continue to produce for a
profit.
Notably, “operating expenses” refers to costs separate from the
discovery, drilling, and beginning stages of an oil well.45 Operating
expenses, therefore, are a fairly definite, or at least calculable, sum that
can be factored into an algorithm establishing an objective test for
whether a well is producing in paying quantities. 46 Ambiguity naturally
remains over the length of time necessary to compare operating expenses
against the profits paid by a well. For example, a well may be
unprofitable in January and February and then have substantial profits in
March and April; if the algorithm were to set the time variable at one
month the lease would lapse, if longer then the lease would continue.
plain meaning of the language used, rather than the silent intentions of the contracting parties,
determines the construction to be given the agreement”).
40. Young, 45 A. at 122.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Swiss Oil Corp. v. Riggsby, 67 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Ky. 1931); Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d
545, 546 (Okla. 1954); Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 690-91 (Tex. 1959).
44. Young, 45 A. at 122-23.
45. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS ET AL., MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 657 (14th ed.
2009) (referring instead to the “[e]xpenses incurred in the operation of a producing property”).
46. Young, 45 A. at 122-23; Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Oil Co., 44 S.E. 433, 436
(W. Va. 1903).
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To reconcile the court’s disfavor with setting a bright-line time
frame within the objective test,47 the court inserted language that appears
to support principles favorable to parties who believe in a purely
subjective test. 48 Not all wells will produce as steadily in paying
quantities as those at issue in Young. Therefore it stands to reason, in
the case of marginal wells that do not continuously and instantaneously
produce above operating expenses, that it is proper to defer to a lessee’s
better judgment. 49 In Young, the production of the wells by the lessees
never failed to produce “in paying quantities” over the period of one
year. 50 Arguably, while courts still disfavor a bright-line rule for the
reasonable time over which to weigh the objective test, the subjective
test should only be used in marginal cases when a reasonable time is
untenable. 51 In certain circumstances, a lessee may be willing to take a
short-term loss in favor of an average net profit. As seen in Young and
Jedlicka, a few months of loss should not negate a profitable oil and gas
lease. 52
Further, the pragmatic and market-focused reasoning of the Young
court supports the subsequent reasoning used by Pennsylvania courts
when interpreting oil and gas leases. Recognizing the risks, investment,
and long-term nature of oil and gas production, the court supported its
conclusion with dicta, opining,
[f]ew wells, except the very largest, repay cost under a considerable

47. See Cassell v. Crothers, 44 A. 446, 446 (Pa. 1899) (refusing to use one-year as the
bright-line, dispositive time frame); Texaco, Inc. v. Fox, 618 P.2d 844, 848 (Kan. 1980) (“The
arbitrary use of a short period of time while a well is down for a workover is obviously
untenable. On the other hand, the use of an unreasonably long period would entail using past
glories during flush production to determine a lease’s present condition, which would give a
distorted result not reflective of the current status of the lease.”).
48. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 275 (Pa. 2012) (“An
operator, exercising his good faith judgment, may be willing to wait longer for one lease to
become 'profitable' than he is willing to wait for another well to become profitable, and unless
it can be established that he is not acting in good faith on his business judgment, but instead is
acting with fraudulent or dishonest intent, he does not forfeit his rights under the lease based
on a difference in such judgment.”).
49. Young, 45 A. at 122.
The operator, who has assumed the obligations of the lease, has put his money and
labor into the undertaking, and is now called upon to determine whether it will pay
to spend some thousands of dollars more in sinking another well to increase the
production of the tract, is entitled to follow his own judgment. If that is exercised in
good faith, a different opinion by the lessor, or the experts, or the court, or all
combined, is of no consequence, and will not authorize a decree interfering with
him.
Id.
50. Id.
51. See Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264.
52. See id. at 276-77.
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time; many never do; but that is no reason why the first loss should
not be reduced by profits, however small, in continuing to operate.
The phrase ‘paying quantities,’ therefore, is to be construed with
reference to the operator, and by his judgment when exercised in
53
good faith.

The Young court understood that the realities of oil and gas
production require some understanding that not all wells, even the most
productive, are productive all the time. This understanding led to a
decision favoring objectivity but appreciating the need for flexibility
with marginal wells.
The two-step analysis outlined in Young limits the applicability of a
subjective test, whenever possible, in favor of an objective test. The
Young court did not address what the subjective analysis should be in
the case of a marginal well. Other oil and gas producing states have
added to Pennsylvania’s Young doctrine. 54
B. Other Oil and Gas Producing States Have Adopted Young,
Advanced Young’s Reasoning, and Have Adopted the More
Appropriate Reasonably Prudent Operator Standard
Oil and gas law began in Pennsylvania after the first oil well was
drilled on August 27, 1859. 55 However, shortly after the Young
decision, 56 oil and gas law shifted its forum of development from
Pennsylvania to twentieth century oil and gas powerhouses such as
Texas, Oklahoma, and Kentucky. 57 Despite the shift, and its nature as
merely persuasive authority, Young remains effectively controlling to the
extent that it is the analytical starting point for oil and gas law of the
various states. 58 Reaching a climax in the landmark case Clifton v.
Koontz, 59 Young’s progeny have retained the two-step process of a
primary objective test, which, if met, triggers a subjective analysis for
deciding whether a well is producing “in paying quantities.” 60
53. Young, 45 A. at 122-23; Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 277-78.
54. E.g., Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1942).
55. Pifer, supra note 23, at 48 (“On August 27, 1859, Colonel Edwin L. Drake drilled
the first commercially successful oil well near Titusville, Pennsylvania.”).
56. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also decided another case in 1899 pertaining to
oil and gas law. See Cassel v. Crothers, 44 A. 446 (Pa. 1899).
57. See Pifer, supra note 23, at 48 (“Despite early contributions to the national body of
oil and gas law, the development of Pennsylvania oil and gas case law slowed considerably
throughout the twentieth century, reflecting the relative decline of the industry in the state.”).
58. See T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 263 (Pa. 2012); Lowther
Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Oil Co., 44 S.E. 433, 436 (W. Va. 1903).
59. 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959).
60. See id. at 691; Swiss Oil Corp. v. Riggsby, 67 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Ky. 1933) (“The term
'paying quantities' is usually defined as being such quantities as will pay a profit, but at least
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The language in Young has been used by a number of states 61
before finally culminating in the language’s inclusion in Koontz. The
notable language first appeared in Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh,
[i]t has been generally held that “paying quantities,” when used in
this connection, means paying quantities to the lessee. If a well pays
a profit, even small, over operating expenses, it produces in paying
quantities, though it may never repay its costs, and the enterprise as a
whole may prove unprofitable. Ordinarily, the phrase is to be
construed with reference to the operator, and by his judgment when
62
exercised in good faith.

In Marsh, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma calculated the profits and
operating expenses of the Gypsy Oil Company to conclude that the
Gypsy Oil Company was operating at a loss and therefore not acting in
good faith by continuing to operate.63
In determining the proper interpretation of what it was to produce
in sufficient quantity, the court relied heavily on Young and its
progeny. 64 As seen earlier in Young, here, too, the court utilized the
term “good faith” in its decision, but only in regards to the objective
numbers, which proved the Gypsy Oil Company was not producing a
profit over operating expenses.65 The language of Young survived in

the cost of operating the well. . . . In determining whether or not a gas or oil well is productive
to this extent, the judgment of an experienced operator or lessee, if exercised in good faith,
will prevail as against that of a lessor without experience.”); Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, a Div.
of Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 869 P.2d 323, 327 (Okla. 1994) (reaffirming Stewart v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 604 P.2d 854 (Okla. 1979) (“In short, the lease continues in existence so long as the
interruption of production in paying quantities does not extend for a period longer than
reasonable or justifiable in light of the circumstances involved. But under no circumstances
will cessation of production in paying quantities ipso facto deprive the lessee of his extendedterm estate.”); Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545, 548 (Okla. 1954) (“We further held that the
standard by which the judgment and good faith of the lessee is measured is whether the lease
is producing, or by the exercise of reasonable skill and diligence could be made to produce,
sufficient oil and gas to justify a reasonable and prudent operator in continuing the operation
thereof.”); Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 511-12 (Tex. 1942); see also Lowther, 44 S.E. at
436 (“If the well pays a profit, even small, over operating expenses, it produces in paying
quantity, though it may never repay its cost, and the operation, as a whole, may result in a
loss. The phrase ‘paying quantities,’ therefore, is to be construed with reference to the
operator and by his judgment, when exercised in good faith.”) (citing Young).
61. See Riggsby, 67 S.W.2d at 31; Clay, 274 P.2d at 546; Clifton v. Koontz, 325
S.W.2d 684 at 690-91 (Tx. 1959).
62. 248 P. 329, 334 (Okla. 1926) (citing, inter alia, Young v. Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121
(Pa. 1899)).
63. Id. The facts of Marsh pitted a landowner against an oil and gas company over a
lease originally signed in 1919. Marsh, who bought a right to the lease from the original
lessor, claimed the lessee had failed to produce in sufficient quantity to continue the lease. Id.
at 330-31.
64. Id. at 334.
65. Id.
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Marsh, showing other courts’ respect for the standard as laid out by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 66
Extensively quoting Marsh and Young, Garcia v. King added a
number of arguments in favor of the practical, even objective,
interpretation of the term “in paying quantities.” 67 First, in Garcia, the
unprofitability of the wells during the secondary period of the lease was
not marginal. 68 Garcia involved a 7,500-acre tract that only paid the
lessor royalty payments on production. 69 The lease originally involved
payment by rent until the lessee was unable to afford the original deal.70
A court allowed the lease to continue via royalty payments, but after an
eight month period of failed production the lessor sought to terminate
the lease. 71
The Supreme Court of Texas found for the lessor. 72 First, the court
held that when the difference between the profits and operating expenses
are substantial, there is no reason to utilize a subjective test to determine
whether the wells were not producing in paying quantities. 73 Second,
the court added support to the argument that oil and gas lease disputes
were to be interpreted practically for the purpose of securing the
development of property to “the mutual benefit of” the land owner and
the oil and gas company. 74 Finally, “[t]he lessors should not be required
to suffer a continuation of the lease after the expiration of the primary
period merely for speculation purposes on the part of the lessees.” 75
Under a purely subjective test, continuing a lease for speculation
purposes would be considered bad faith. Garcia, however, did not
prescribe a precedent doing away with the objective element outlined in
Young but in fact proved the utility of a two-step procedure in
determining if a well is producing in paying quantities. 76
66. While nearly nine decades old, Marsh is still good law.
67. 164 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1942).
68. Compare id. at 512 (“[A]ll of the producing wells on the lease in question at the
time of the termination of the primary period were not producing enough oil or gas to pay a
profit over and above the cost of operating the wells. . . .”), with T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co.
v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 264 (Pa. 2012) (“[I]n 1959, T.W. Phillips suffered a loss of
approximately $40 as a result of operations under the Findley lease.”).
69. Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at 509-10.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 512-13.
73. Id. at 512. Again, it is always important to reaffirm that “in paying quantities” is a
contentious term because so long as a well is producing in paying quantities an oil and gas
lease will continue. See Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 267 (Pa. 2012) (citing Jacobs v. CNG
Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 764 (D. Pa. 2004)).
74. Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at 512.
75. Id. at 513 (in dicta).
76. When a well does not even marginally produce at a profit greater than operating
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The factual circumstances in Clifton v. Koontz 77 parallel the
difficulties of interpreting Young later faced in Jedlicka. 78 In both
Koontz and Jedlicka, a party challenged a marginal well and the
reasonable time over which to weigh the profits and operating expenses
was not readily apparent. 79 Building on Garcia, the court in Koontz
stated,
[t]he underlying reason for [the Young definition of in paying
quantities] appears to be that when a lessee is making a profit over
the actual cash he must expend to produce the lease, he is entitled to
continue operating in order to recover the expense of drilling and
equipping, although he may never make a profit on the over-all
80
operation.

The Koontz court looked at the purpose of the definition supplied in
Young in order to provide the subjective second step that Young left
ambiguous. 81
After weighing the interests of the lessor and lessee, the court
confirmed that in the case of a marginal well the objective test
necessitates a secondary subjective analysis.82 Naturally, the lessee
should be entitled to seek a profit, but only in the case of a well
producing, or marginally close to producing, in paying quantities.
Therefore, to conclude that a well is in fact marginally close to
producing in paying quantities, the Koontz court supplied the reasonably
prudent operator standard to satisfy the subjective element alluded to by
Young. 83
The reasonably prudent operator standard keeps the burden of proof
with the party seeking to end the lease. Moreover, under the reasonably
prudent operator standard, “the standard by which paying quantities is
expenses, there is no utility in looking at the subjective character of the lessee. See Young v.
Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121, 122-23 (Pa. 1899).
77. 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959).
78. 42 A.3d at 271-72.
79. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d. at 688-89 (“Petitioners base their contention that the well had
ceased to produce in paying quantities upon the showing that for the period of time from June,
1955 through September, 1956, the income from the lease was $3,250 and that the total
expense of operations during the same period was $3,466.16–thus, a loss of $216.16 for the
sixteen months' period selected by petitioners. During the period of time indicated, some
months showed a gain and some a loss.”).
80. Id. at 692.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 691.
83. Id. (“In the case of a marginal well, such as we have here, the standard by which
paying quantities is determined is whether or not under all the relevant circumstances a
reasonably prudent operator would, for the purpose of making a profit and not merely for
speculation, continue to operate a well in the manner in which the well in question was
operated.”).
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determined is whether or not under all the relevant circumstances a
reasonably prudent operator would, for the purpose of making a profit
and not merely for speculation, continue to operate a well in the manner
in which the well in question was operated.” 84 Therefore, to prove a
reasonably prudent operator would not continue to produce a marginal
well, a lessor may supply experts and expert testimony. 85
Starting with the same precedent at issue in Jedlicka and Young,
sister states, including Texas and Oklahoma, have advanced oil and gas
law throughout the twentieth century by creating the reasonably prudent
operator standard. 86 With an appreciation for the ambiguities left by
Young, in the case of a marginal well, the reasonably prudent operator
standard emerged naturally during the twentieth century. 87 The resulting
standard allows landowners to use the court system to their benefit and
does not insulate corporations from legitimate claims. The reasonably
prudent operator standard would also support a landowner like Jim in his
litigation against Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. 88
Indeed, the language supporting the objective test, described as the
primary step in determining if a well is producing in paying quantities in
Koontz, was directly traceable to Young, via Marsh and Garcia. 89
Logically, then, there is great support for the argument that Young
prescribed a two-step analysis in determining whether or not a well is
producing “in paying quantities”—rather than a test only focused on
subjective good faith. 90 Young’s progeny, especially Garcia and Koontz,
filled in the ambiguity left by Young in 1899. The objective test should
be applied when the well either clearly produced a profit greater than
operating expenses or clearly produced a profit short of operating
expenses. 91 When the objective test is inconclusive or there is not a
reasonable time over which to weigh the profits and costs—a marginal
well—the reasonably prudent operator standard governs. 92
Contrary to other states’ development of oil and gas lease law
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id.; Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545, 548 (Okla. 1954) (“We further held that the
standard by which the judgment and good faith of the lessee is measured is whether the lease
is producing, or by the exercise of reasonable skill and diligence could be made to produce,
sufficient oil and gas to justify a reasonable and prudent operator in continuing the operation
thereof.”); Garcia v. King, 67 S.W.2d 509, 511-12 (Tex. 1942).
87. See cases cited supra note 86.
88. See supra Introduction, A.
89. See Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 248 P. 329, 334 (Okla. 1926); Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at
513.
90. Young v. Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121, 123 (Pa. 1899).
91. See Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at 513.
92. See Koontz, 325 S.W.2d at 691.
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during the twentieth century, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
developed a purely subjective test and, in effect, insulated oil and gas
companies from unwanted lease termination based on lack of
production. 93
C. The Jedlicka Court Instilled a Good Faith Business Judgment
Standard but not Without Confusion and Dissent
In Jedlicka, the lessor, Jedlicka, owned a tract of land within a
larger tract conveyed to T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Company by a 1928
oil and gas lease (the “Findley Lease”). 94 Along with an explanation of
royalty payment clauses, the Findley Lease contained a habendum
clause. 95 The habendum clause provided,
[t]o have and to hold the above-described premises for the sole and
only purpose of drilling and operating for oil and gas with the
exclusive right to operate for same for the term of two years, and as
96
long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities. . .

The term “in paying quantities” is not outlined or defined within the
Findley Lease, but it was written in accordance with Young. 97 One year
after signing, the Lessee drilled four gas wells on the Lessor’s expanse,
followed by four more wells after the original four were fractured. 98 The
second set of four wells was drilled subsequent to a conveyance by T.W.
Phillips Gas & Oil Co. (“T.W. Phillips”) to PC Exploration in 2004.99
PC Exploration wanted to drill four more wells on the Jedlicka tract after
the 2004 wells were completed.100 Jedlicka objected to the final set of
four wells opining the Findley Lease was no longer valid because T.W.
Phillips failed to produce oil or gas in paying quantities in 1959. 101
Specifically, Jedlicka maintained Lessee suffered a forty-dollar loss in
1959, terminating the lease and creating a tenancy at will. 102
On April 16, 2007, the case was heard before a trial court that
found for the lessees based on the oil and gas company's good faith in
continuing to produce oil and gas before, throughout, and subsequent to

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See infra Part II.C-D.
T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 263-64 (Pa. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
45 A. 121 (Pa. 1899); see Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264.
Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 267.
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1959. 103 On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed. 104 Jedlicka appealed,
and in 2009 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed to review de
novo the question: “[d]id the Superior Court misapply the decision of
this Court in Young v. Forest Oil Co., 105 by holding that Pennsylvania
employs a purely subjective test to determine whether an oil or gas lease
has produced in paying quantities.” 106
The majority 107 affirmed, deciding that the purely subjective test
applied by the trial court was the correct interpretation of Young.108 The
majority outlined the legal arguments of both sides in order to show the
clear divide in the interpretations applied by each party, respectively. 109
Then, citing several decisions from other jurisdictions, the majority
concluded that a purely objective test, as Jedlicka argued for, is not
workable without a set and reasonable time period within which to
measure production. 110 Finally, the court claimed to create a two-step
interpretation of Young while actually creating an entirely new good
faith business judgment standard. 111 First, this new interpretation
requires a determination of whether the lessee produces a profit, no
matter how small, over the operating expenses. It then requires a
determination of whether the well objectively produces “in paying
quantities.” 112 Second, if the well does not produce a profit over
operating expenses, then the court must look to the subjective good faith
management of the lessee in operating the well at a loss. 113 The majority
acknowledged that interpreting the habendum clause to protect the lessee
is contrary to the original purpose of such clauses but found the new
interpretation in line with Young and an unambiguous reading of the
language. 114
103. Id. at 265 (“[N]otwithstanding the $40 loss suffered in 1959, Appellees had
produced gas on their leasehold in paying quantities, and, therefore, [] the Findley lease
remained in effect. In determining that Appellees produced gas in paying quantities, the trial
court relied on this Court's 1899 decision in Young v. Forest Oil, wherein we held that
consideration should be given to a lessee's good faith judgment when determining whether oil
was produced in paying quantities.”).
104. Id. at 266.
105. 45 A. 121 (Pa. 1899).
106. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 266 (internal quotations omitted). See also T.W. Phillips Gas
and Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 978 A.2d 347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
107. The Majority opinion was written by Justice Todd, joined by Chief Justice Castille
and Justices Baer and McAffrey.
108. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 274-75.
109. Id. at 270-71.
110. Id. at 275.
111. Id. at 276.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 271 (noting habendum clauses were originally meant to protect lessors).
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In an exceptionally short concurring opinion, Justice Eakin
highlighted the shortsightedness of the majority opinion. Justice Eakin
iterated that a habendum clause may be "a shield or a sword," for the
parties entering into an oil and gas lease.115 The majority opinion,
however, only allows a habendum clause to be used as a shield by the
lessee. 116 Further, underscored throughout the opinions in Jedlicka is the
real difference between the uses of habendum clauses now and when
Young was decided in 1899. 117 Rather than supporting the majority’s
mistaken harmonization of the good faith standard and the reasonably
prudent operator standard, Justice Eakin found discussion of the
reasonably prudent operator standard “inapposite to this lease.”118
Justice Eakin saw through the pretense of Lessors’ claims but was
unable to prevent the misbalancing applied by the majority. 119
Justice Saylor, the lone dissenter, argued that the majority and the
trial court misapplied the Young decision and created a purely subjective
test. 120 He opined that Young prescribed a hybrid two-pronged test, but
the proper analysis is hinged on the threshold objective question of
whether the lessee was producing a profit over the operating expenses.121
Only if the critical first prong is met should the court analyze the
subjective good faith of the operating lessee.122 This argument hinges,
importantly, on the original purpose of the habendum clause in 1928—to
protect the lessor from unfair speculation by the lessee. 123 Justice Saylor
stated that the proper interpretation of the language in Young allows for
reference to a lessee’s good faith because there are wells that, while
producing at a very small profit, will never cover their original
expenses. 124 Contrary to the Jedlicka majority’s opinion, Young
conceivably created narrower circumstances through which a lease may
extend indefinitely. 125 Justice Saylor, in effect, argued the reference to

115. Id. at 278 (Eakin, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 271(majority opinion).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 278 (Eakin, J., concurring).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 278-79 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 279.
122. Id.
123. Id. But cf. id. at 277 (noting that, currently, habendum clauses are being used by
lessors to end otherwise profitable wells).
124. Id. at 282 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
125. Justice Saylor believes Young created a narrower interpretation of “in paying
quantities,” rather than the expanded one used by the majority in Jedlicka. Id. at 279 (“The
objective and threshold element is that profits must exceed operating expenses, i.e., that the
well must be at least marginally profitable. If profits exceed operating expenses, then the
subjective component—the lessee's good-faith judgment—comes into play. In those
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good faith comes into play if a well is producing in paying quantities
over operating expenses, but the lessee in good faith could allow a lease
to terminate. 126 According to Justice Saylor, the reference to good faith
was meant to allow a lessee to terminate a productive lease more easily
rather than retain an unproductive agreement. 127
Further, Justice Saylor argued that the reasonably prudent operator
standard implemented in other states was incorporated into the majority
decision. 128 Justice Saylor seemed to imply that the majority might have
tried, and failed, to implement the reasonably prudent operator standard
from other jurisdictions. 129 While Justice Saylor believed the reasonably
prudent operator standard might be appropriate for Pennsylvania, he
acknowledged that the narrow issue on appeal was whether the trial
court interpreted Young correctly. 130 Finally, Justice Saylor differed
from the majority's belief that the subjective good faith standard applied
in the present case was harmonious with the reasonably prudent operator
standard as applied in other jurisdictions.131
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania read, cited to, and appreciated
the value of other states’ development of the test to determine when a
well is producing in paying quantities.132 Despite this, the justices
misinterpreted the delicate differences between the good faith business
judgment standard and the reasonably prudent operator standard
designed in other states. 133 The reasonably prudent operator standard
created an avenue for landowners to terminate unproductive leases held
onto by speculating oil and gas lease companies. The good faith
business judgment standard insulates oil and gas companies from
termination so long as they maintain the appearance of good faith. The
result of Jedlicka, therefore, is an unfair burden on landowners when
trying to end an unproductive or even harmful lease.

instances, it should be presumed that the lessee is operating the lease in good faith, and unless
the lessor rebuts this presumption, the lease is said to be producing in ‘paying quantities.’”).
126. Id. at 278-79.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 282 (Saylor, J., dissenting). This Note refutes this premise based on affect.
In reality, the Majority Justices may have contemplated other states’ persuasive authority. If
they did, they misinterpreted the reasonably prudent operator standard.
129. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 282.
130. Id. See also id. at 270 n.11 (“Jedlicka emphasizes she is not suggesting that Young
be overruled. Indeed, she states: [t]o be abundantly clear, [Jedlicka] is not advocating that this
Court overturn Young .... It has always been [Jedlicka's] contention that Young was properly
decided ... and should, therefore, be affirmed and applied to this case.”).
131. Id. at 285 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 268-76.
133. See id.
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II. THE PURELY SUBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH BUSINESS JUDGMENT
STANDARD TEST CREATED BY THE JEDLICKA MAJORITY IMPROPERLY
BALANCES THE INTERESTS INVOLVED IN AN OIL AND GAS LEASE
Under the good faith business judgment standard for determining
whether a well is producing “in paying quantities,” a landowner may
only be released from an unprofitable lease by proving a lessee’s bad
faith. 134 With the burden on the landowner, lessees are essentially
shielded from petitions alleging unprofitable production. If a landowner
brings a petition against a lessee alleging bad faith, the landowner will
not be able to present evidence to a jury since bad faith is nearly
impossible to prove outside hypothetical realms. 135
While the standard used in Jedlicka places a substantial burden on
plaintiffs, an argument in favor of the Jedlicka test may be that keeping
juries from deciding when a lease is producing in paying quantities is a
protection from local bias leading to arbitrary findings for local
landowners. Such an argument overestimates the likelihood of abuse
under the reasonably prudent operator standard. When the potential
worst-case scenarios of the good faith business judgment standard and
the reasonably prudent operator standard are compared, the reasonably
prudent operator standard is superior.
This Part proposes that the good faith business judgment standard
imputed by the Jedlicka majority makes the indefinite term in a
habendum clause nearly impossible to terminate, and notes that the good
faith business judgment standard prevents juries from deciding when a
well is profitably producing oil and/or natural gas. This Part then
extrapolates from the procedural problems that Jedlicka creates for
lessors, and weighs the reasonably prudent operator standard and the
good faith business judgment standard, finding the former to be the
lesser of two evils. Finally, this Part lays out a framework that applies to
landowners considering their options before entering into an oil and gas
lease in this post-Jedlicka era.
A. The Landowner’s New Obligation to Prove Bad Faith
The shift in the
operator to the good
procedural posture of
definition of bad faith
continuing production

burden of proof from the reasonably prudent
faith business judgment standard changes the
potential future litigation. The common law
will likely be enough to prove a lessee was not
in good faith. 136 Therefore, plaintiffs may be

134. See id. at 276.
135. See generally Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Director's Good Faith, 55 BUFF. L. REV.
457, 462 (2007).
136. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006).
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entitled to relief if they are able to prove that an oil and gas company
purposely continued production with an actual intent to do harm to the
agreement or land. Proving bad faith requires direct evidence of malice
or incredibly culpable negligence. 137
As a result of the high burden of proof necessary to find bad faith,
circumstantial evidence is not enough to find liability or even get to a
jury. 138 Even with a team of experienced lawyers and favorable
discovery decisions, to be successful, a plaintiff would have to find the
metaphorical “smoking gun” or present candid testimony, which
amounts to a confession of intentional bad faith.139 Moreover, a plaintiff
would have to find sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary
judgment prior to contemplating trial.140
The only realistic way for a landowner to successfully prove a
lessee’s bad faith would be to find evidence of the oil and gas company
continuing a lease solely for speculation purposes. 141 The purpose of an
oil and gas lease is to provide an opportunity for two parties to exploit a
resource that would not be reachable without the cooperative
agreement. 142 If a lessee continues a lease for the purpose of
speculation, i.e. in order to prevent a competitor from benefitting, he or
137. Id.
138. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Two working principles underlie
our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”)
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
139. See id.
140. PA. R. CIV. P. § 1035.2 (2012).
141. See Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959) (“In the case of a
marginal well, such as we have here, the standard by which paying quantities is determined is
whether or not under all the relevant circumstances a reasonably prudent operator would, for
the purpose of making a profit and not merely for speculation, continue to operate a well in
the manner in which the well in question was operated.”); Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509,
513 (Tex. 1942) (“The lessors should not be required to suffer a continuation of the lease after
the expiration of the primary period merely for speculation purposes on the part of the
lessees.”); see also 3-6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 604.5 (2001)
(“Pennsylvania has reaffirmed its commitment to the subjective 'good faith' standard in
determining whether or not there is production in paying quantities. The lessor bears the
burden of establishing a lack of good faith and the mere showing that there was a monetary
loss in one year will not survive a motion for summary judgment requested by the lessee.”).
142. See T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 264 (Pa. 2012) (“To
have and to hold the above-described premises for the sole and only purpose of drilling and
operating for oil and gas with the exclusive right to operate for same for the term of two years,
and as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities, or operations for oil or gas
are being conducted thereon, including the right to drill other wells.”) (citing Lease, July 2,
1928, at 1 (R.R. at 13a–14a)); Rachel L. Allen & Scotland M. Duncan, The Standard Oil and
Gas Lease - and Why it is Not, 13 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 155, 166 (2011) (“The granting of an oil and
gas lease carries with it the implied right to use as much of the surface area as is reasonably
necessary for the purposes specified in the lease.” (emphasis added)).
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she would be acting contrary to the purpose of the original oil and gas
lease. It would be nonsensical for a marginal oil and gas lease to
continue indefinitely, based on producing “in paying quantities,” for a
purpose other than for the mutual benefit of both parties. Evidencing
bad faith requires a party proving the intent of the other party in
continuing production. Logically, the intentions of a lessee can only be
established from the words or writings of the lessee.
A pro-industry argument may be that an oil and gas company has
no interest in continuing a lease that is not producing in paying
quantities. However, such an argument fails to factor in the value of
speculation. When weighing the shortcomings of a purely subjective
interpretation of in paying quantities, the Supreme Court of Kansas
noted, a lessee:
may consider it to be to his economic advantage to continue a
marginal or losing operation in order to take advantage of possibile
[sic] discoveries in formations other than the formation from which
he is producing. He may also anticipate a change in marketing
conditions or market prices of oil or gas. There may also be other
circumstances which indicate to him that a current operating loss
143
may eventually be turned into a profit in the long run.

The increased supply of natural gas has significantly lowered
natural gas prices; as a result some producers are holding back on their
production rates in order to control the supply. 144 A lessee, in his or her
business judgment, may benefit from the continuation of a lease for
purely speculative purposes. 145 The benefit, however, is not in the best
interest of the landowner.
If a lessee continues production for speculation purposes the lease
is not continuing for the benefit of both parties. Therefore, if a lessee is
purely speculating during the indeterminate period of the lease, he or she
is continuing production in bad faith. Accordingly, even under the good
faith business judgment standard imputed by the Jedlicka majority, 146 a
lessee’s continued production for speculative purposes would terminate
the indefinite term of an oil and gas lease. Unfortunately, the
opportunity to prove the bad faith may be illusory.

143. Reese Enter., Inc. v. Lawson, 553 P.2d 885, 897 (Kan. 1976).
144. Marc Levy, Associated Press, Fracking for Natural Gas Being Powered by it,
Too, YAHOO NEWS (Jan. 20, 2013, 2:58 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/fracking-natural-gasbeing-powered-170628804.html (“Production has increased so much that natural gas has
flooded the market, dragging down prices and forcing companies to pull back on their plans to
expand drilling while looking for new ways to use gas.”).
145. Reese, 553 P.2d at 897.
146. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 266-67.
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B. Landowners Lack Access to the Jury on Questions of Bad Faith
A landowner must prove bad faith to be relieved from an oil and
gas lease with a term clause similar to “for as long as oil or gas is
produced in paying quantities.” As established supra, only with clear
proof can a landowner prove bad faith. In the unlikely event a lessor has
sufficient proof to win at trial, he or she would win on summary
judgment without the need for a jury. 147 What the Jedlicka majority has
essentially created is a system where, in the case of a marginal well, the
lessee is protected from termination so long as production continues and
no outward evidence of bad faith exists. The burden of proof is so high
that for a landowner to be successful in defeating summary judgment he
or she must prove bad faith, and any proof of bad faith would be
sufficient for the landowner to win on his or her own motion for
summary judgment. In Pennsylvania there is currently no discretion for
a jury to decide when an oil and gas company is continuing production
of a marginal lease in good faith.148
Returning to the hypothetical of Jim’s lease with Good-Faith Oil
and Gas Co., the difficulty created by Jedlicka is apparent. If Jim lives
in Pennsylvania and believes Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. is continuing
to produce oil and gas from his land even though the company knows its
operating expenses will be greater than the profits produced, Jim’s
burden of proof is exceptionally high. Jim may find multiple experts in
the oil and gas producing field who strongly believe that Good-Faith is
holding on to Jim’s lease in order to use improved technology and higher
prices in the future to make Jim’s land profitable. However, in
Pennsylvania, they cannot testify to a jury to that effect absent separate
evidence of bad faith. In Pennsylvania, the court will defer to the good
faith business judgment of the lessee that Good-Faith is continuing

147. In a recent 2013 motion for dismissal with prejudice pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6), the Middle District of Pennsylvania both extended and limited the good faith
standard outlined in Jedlicka. Stewart v. SWEPI, LP, No. 4:11-CV-2241, 2013 WL 170181
(D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2013). In Stewart, the lessor is seeking to terminate his lease alleging that the
lessee built a well for the sole purpose of continuing a lease for speculation purposes. Id. The
federal court found that the well being built very recently before the lease was due to expire
was constructed “solely for the purpose of extending the lease,” that the lessee had done
nothing to produce oil or gas since, and that there were facts sufficient to deny the lessee’s
motion to dismiss. Id. At least in one federal court obvious facts of speculation have been
sufficient to aver the bad faith requirement imputed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Jedlicka. Id. Also, the court in Stewart applied the good faith standard outside the factual
confines of a lease containing the production in paying quantities language and in effect
extended the applicability of Jedlicka. Id. Most importantly for the purposes of this Note, the
plaintiffs in Stewart were able to plead sufficient circumstantial inferences of bad faith; there
is no reference to whether the plaintiffs would be able to prove the alleged bad faith.
148. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 266-67.

2014]

NOT BALANCING WELL INTERESTS WELL

91

production for present profit. 149 Therefore, unless Will provided Jim
with evidence that Good-Faith was continuing production at a loss
strictly for speculation purposes, which is highly unlikely, Jim will be
unable to prove bad faith.
Also, note that if Will was able to provide Jim with sufficient
evidence to successfully allege bad faith, such evidence would be
sufficient to win on summary judgment. 150 It is important to remember,
however, that oil and gas companies are sophisticated business
organizations, likely with expensive and talented lawyers, rendering the
discovery of evidence establishing bad faith incredibly unlikely. In sum,
Jedlicka has ultimately created an inequitable system where a lease will
continue until the oil and gas company wants it to end.
C. Hindering Landowner Rights to Avoid Local Bias?
Jedlicka is illustrative of the typical way that a landowner will
bring suit against a lessee. 151 Petitioner, Jedlicka, brought the action,
which was originally decided by the court of proper jurisdiction in the
county where Jedlicka’s tract was located. 152 A charge against the
reasonably prudent operator standard might be that it puts too much
power in the hands of juries in deciding valuable leases. The fear is
compounded by lease disputes being decided in the jurisdiction
containing the leased property. 153 Many of the counties in Northern and
Central Pennsylvania, which are regions within the Marcellus Shale
formation, are less populated than the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia
areas. 154 Critics of the reasonably prudent operator standard, and the
Jedlicka majority, may fear small town juries arbitrarily supporting their

149. Id. at 276-77 (“Where . . . production on a well has been marginal or sporadic,
such that, over some period, the well's profits do not exceed its operating expenses, a
determination of whether the well has produced in paying quantities requires consideration of
the operator's good faith judgment in maintaining operation of the well. In assessing whether
an operator has exercised his judgment in good faith in this regard, a court must consider the
reasonableness of the time period during which the operator has continued his operation of the
well in an effort to reestablish the well's profitability.”).
150. PA. R. CIV. P. 1035.2 (2012).
151. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264-66.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Law firms have interpreted Jedlicka on their websites. See, e.g., Nathaniel I.
Holland, Know How: PA Supreme Court Affirms Good Faith Test of Production in Paying
Quantities, STEPTOE & JOHNSON (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.steptoe-johnson.com/content/
pa-supreme-court-affirms-good-faith-test-production-paying-quantities
(“[The
Jedlicka]
opinion is notable for a number of reasons: 1) it reaffirms the longstanding rule that the lessee
is in the best position to make business decisions regarding its leases, which should not be
second guessed absent evidence of an illicit intent.”) (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
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neighbors, or purposely injuring large corporate lessees. 155
Those who support the Jedlicka good faith business judgment rule
will argue that the good faith standard still allows a potential process for
relief. 156 If a landowner has actual proof of bad faith through motives of
pure speculation then he or she is entitled to re-lease. Therefore, it can
be argued that it was not worth lowering the burden of proof for a
landowner to end a lease if there is the potential risk of an arbitrary
judgment.
A jury may rely on any evidence or expert testimony presented at
trial when making decisions of fact. Further, understanding what a jury
chooses to believe is an exercise for mystics. Fear of arbitrary judgment
against an oil and gas company is a legitimate interest that must be
balanced in establishing a test for whether a lease is producing in paying
quantities. When compared to the problems that arise from the good
faith business judgment standard—however—the concerns with the
reasonably prudent operator standard are trivial.
D. The Reasonably Prudent Operator Standard is the Lesser of Two
Evils
Both the good faith business judgment and the reasonably prudent
operator standards fail to completely insulate the lessor and lessee from
abuse by the other party. Under the reasonably prudent operator
standard, a lessee may suffer an arbitrary decision by a locally biased
jury ending a long-term profitable lease. 157 Under the good faith
business judgment standard, a lessor may be trapped in an unprofitable
lease simply because there is not sufficient evidence to allege bad
faith. 158 In properly balancing the interests of the lessor and lessee, the
good faith business judgment standard is more harmful than the
reasonably prudent operator standard, based on both the likelihood and
scale of potential detriment.
Recall the difficulty Jim faced under the good faith business
judgment standard hypothetical. In Pennsylvania, the court will defer to
the good faith business judgment of the lessee that Good-Faith Oil and
155. David Bowen, Gunned Down – By the Law: Foreign Firms Can Be Soft Targets in
the ‘Jackpot’ Mentality of US Litigation, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 16, 1997), http://www.inde
pendent.co.uk/news/business/gunned-down--by-the-law-1278866.html (“It is perhaps too easy
to drum up an image of xenophobic rednecks determined to kick foreign butt, but it is
undoubtedly true that small-town juries will give the home team an advantage . . . . [m]y
advice is to avoid a jury trial, especially if you’re a foreigner going up against a local
company.”).
156. See generally Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 275-77.
157. Bowen, supra note 155.
158. See Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 276-77.
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Gas Co. is continuing production for present profit. 159 Therefore, unless
an unlikely situation occurs, like Will providing Jim with evidence that
Good-Faith was continuing production at a loss strictly for speculation
purposes, Jim will be unable to demonstrate bad faith. Further, oil and
gas companies are sophisticated business organizations, and finding
evidence of bad faith is incredibly unlikely. Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co.
is essentially allowed to continue an oil and gas lease indefinitely so
long as they continue production under the pretense of good faith profit
seeking.
Jim believes his prized show cows are dying from the run-off of the
hydraulic fracturing solution containing toxic chemicals. He does not
have strict evidentiary support for his allegation so he cannot sue for
damages or end the lease based on waste.160 Thinking he could take
advantage of the sporadic unprofitability of the wells on his land, Jim
attempted to assert that the indefinite term of the lease had ended
because it was no longer producing “in paying quantities.” In
Pennsylvania, with deference to Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co.’s alleged
good faith, Jim cannot terminate his lease. Even with a number of
experts supporting Jim’s position—that the oil and gas in his land has
been extracted to the point it is no longer profitable to continue
production—potentially harmful hydraulic fracturing will endure.
The prospective shortcomings of the good faith business judgment
standard trap a landowner in an indefinite lease subject to the whims of
the oil and gas-producing lessee. Such a result is contrary to the
originally agreed upon purposes of the lease. 161 Further, the Jedlicka
majority acknowledged that interpreting the habendum clause to protect
the lessee is contrary to the original purpose of such clauses.162
When compared to the harms of the good faith business judgment
standard, the deficiencies of the reasonably prudent operator standard
appear trivial. Suppose Jim’s real purpose for trying to assert his lease

159. Id. (“Where . . . production on a well has been marginal or sporadic, such that,
over some period, the well's profits do not exceed its operating expenses, a determination of
whether the well has produced in paying quantities requires consideration of the operator's
good faith judgment in maintaining operation of the well. In assessing whether an operator
has exercised his judgment in good faith in this regard, a court must consider the
reasonableness of the time period during which the operator has continued his operation of the
well in an effort to reestablish the well's profitability.”).
160. H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 24, at 2 (“Although some
companies did provide information about these proprietary fluids, in most cases the
companies stated that they did not have access to proprietary information about products they
purchased ‘off the shelf’ from chemical suppliers.”).
161. Allen & Duncan, supra note 142, at 166.
162. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 271 (noting habendum clauses were originally meant to
protect lessors).

94

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:68

with Good-Faith Oil and Gas Co. is not to protect his prized show cows.
Jim has met other farmers whose leases are more financially favorable to
the lessor. Perhaps, as Good-Faith would likely argue, the reason for
Jim’s suit is really an attempt to renegotiate for a more favorable lease.
Indeed, the justices hearing the Jedlicka appeal acknowledged that many
landowners in Pennsylvania are trying to get out of their original leases
to renegotiate for more favorable terms. 163 Compounding potential harm
of the reasonably prudent operator standard is a possibility when local
juries might arbitrarily find in favor of local landowners based on localbias. 164 Plainly, there is a potential tangible impairment created by using
the reasonably prudent operator standard as the test for when a marginal
well is producing in paying quantities. The test inevitably devolves into
a question of which is worse: for a large oil and gas corporation to
renegotiate, or a landowner to be trapped in an unfavorable, or even
harmful, oil and gas lease.
While this Note argues that the disadvantages of the good faith
business judgment standard are more detrimental than the reasonably
prudent operator standard, it still acknowledges the fear of arbitrary jury
findings as a legitimate concern. The likely prevalence of each
respective harm should prove that the reasonably prudent operator
standard is the more beneficial outlet. The likelihood of a jury actually
shirking its duties and arbitrarily finding for its members’ neighbors is
slight.165 Further, while appellate courts are likely to give findings of
fact due deference, they still provide corporations with an avenue of
redress for legal errors. 166 The more prudent justice system will shift the
difficult burden of proof from the farmer to the wealthy corporation
capable of affording the best lawyers money can buy.
Further, the underlying purpose of oil and gas leases—mutual gain
from untapped resources—must shape the outcome of all litigation
arising from such leases. Under the reasonably prudent operator

163. Id. at 277 (“Consideration of the operator's good faith judgment in determining
whether a well has produced in paying quantities, however, also protects a lessee from lessors
who, by exploiting a brief period when a well has not produced a profit, seek to invalidate a
lease with the hope of making a more profitable leasing arrangement.”).
164. Bowen, supra note 155.
165. See Newton N. Minow, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40
AM. U. L. REV. 631, 633 (1991) (“Courts employ a variety of techniques in their attempt to
minimize the partiality problem. The technique most heavily relied upon is the voir dire
process, by which lawyers and judges question potential jurors to determine bias.”); see also
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (“[I]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.") (citing
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910)).
166. See generally Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 263-64 (the procedural history of Jedlicka
shows the appellate courts’ willingness to review findings of oil and gas leases).
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standard, if a well were only marginally producing and a reasonably
prudent operator standard would continue production for a profit, the
lease would continue to the honest benefit of both parties. On the other
hand, if a reasonably prudent operator would only hold onto a tract of
land for speculation purposes, then the mutual benefit that served as
consideration for the original lease would be terminated. The lease, too,
should then terminate. Should the parties come to an appropriate
arrangement recognizing the speculation, then a new lease may be
drafted based on the new purpose. An oil and gas lease is in the nature
of a contract. 167 Without sufficient consideration, a contract for the use
of land should not be equitably enforced. 168 An indefinite lease subject
to a “thereafter” term in a habendum clause is arguably similar to an
employment-at-will where agreement for the next day’s work is based
on appropriate ongoing consideration. 169
When balancing the interests involved in an oil and gas lease, the
addition of a subjective element necessarily leaves the door open for
abuse by one party or another. Under the reasonably prudent operator
standard, the abuse likely feared is that a landowner will take advantage
of technical language and a favorable jury makeup to end a lease
prematurely. This is a realistic fear because of the favorable possibilities
renegotiation provides for a lessor. 170 However, the tools still available
to an oil and gas company under the reasonably prudent operator
standard—sophisticated lawyers, voir dire of juries, and appeals—
completely mitigate the risk of abuse. On the other hand, a landowner
pitted against a large corporation faces an uphill battle; the
implementation of the good faith business judgment standard
exacerbates the very difficult burden for a landowner. Therefore, the

167. Id. at 267.
168. McKinnon v. Benedict, 157 N.W.2d 665, 672 (Wis. 1968) (“Considering all the
factors—the inadequacy of the consideration, the small benefit that would be accorded [the
non-landholders], and the oppressive conditions imposed upon the [landholder]—we conclude
that this contract failed to meet the test of reasonableness that is the sine qua non of the
enforcement of rights in an action in equity.”). In McKinnon, the court found an agreement
between neighbors unenforceable based on a very small benefit to a landowner that bound him
to an oppressive land use restriction. Id. The principals upheld in McKinnon are comparable
to those at issue here; landowners receiving very little benefit in exchange for an economically
harmful use or restriction of their land.
169. See generally 3-6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 604 (2001) (prior to
1975, Louisiana added another factor to the paying quantities doctrine. The rule here not only
demanded that production be in paying quantities to the lessee, but that it also furnishes an
adequate consideration to the lessor).
170. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 277 (“Consideration of the operator's good faith judgment in
determining whether a well has produced in paying quantities, however, also protects a lessee
from lessors who, by exploiting a brief period when a well has not produced a profit, seek to
invalidate a lease with the hope of making a more profitable leasing arrangement.”).
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more appropriate interest balancing in a disputed oil and gas lease
necessitates the application of the reasonably prudent operator standard.
E. Landowners Must Take Steps to Prevent Oil and Gas Companies
from Abusing Leases
While advocating for the reasonably prudent operator standard, this
Note recognizes the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in favor
of the good faith business judgment standard as part of the test for
determining when a lease is producing oil and gas in paying quantities.
Accordingly, this Note attempts to set forth a framework for lawyers and
landowners to consider their options moving forward under the good
faith business judgment standard. 171 The most important reality is that
oil and gas companies want to consummate and perform their
obligations under leases. Without land rich in oil and gas reserves,
producing companies cannot fulfill their main function: producing oil
and gas. Fittingly, if an oil and gas landsman approaches a landowner
with a lease, the landowner has significant power in deciding the
conditions and terms of the lease.172
The first and most important thing a landowner should do after
being approached by a landsman 173 is consult a lawyer who practices oil
and gas law. A lawyer may be able to understand the intricacies of an
oil and gas lease, including the implications of the habendum clause
usage of “in paying quantities.” 174 Further, as this Note has established,
oil and gas companies have sophisticated lawyers at their disposal, so
too should landowners. A lessor ought to protect his or her self with
representation as early in the leasing process as possible in order to
hedge his or her potential future interests. The most important service a
lawyer will provide for a landowner is advising, and potentially
mediating, the negotiations between the landowner and landsman.
An oil and gas company wants land to develop oil and gas wells
and to make money. Landowners, by definition, have land that an oil
171. Unfortunately, landowners already subject to leases with an indeterminate
habendum clause cannot benefit from advice on their negotiation power.
172. See Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Landowners and Oil
and Gas Leases in Pennsylvania, COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://www.elibrary.
dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-91369/8000-FS-DEP2834.pdf (last visited Feb. 16,
2014) (responding to the hypothetical query of what to do when first being approached with a
lease by recommending talking to an attorney and negotiating for what a lessor wants).
173. “Landsman” or “landman” is the name for a person who contracts with landowners
to form an oil and gas lease. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS ET AL., MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS
TERMS (14th ed. 2009). A landsman is often the first person a landowner comes in contact
with from the oil and gas industry.
174. Law firms have interpreted Jedlicka on their websites. See Holland, supra note
154.
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and gas company would want to lease. Therefore, even though a
landowner stands to make significant money from a lease, they have a
lucrative bargaining chip. A landowner should negotiate for the interests
most important to him or her before entering into an oil and gas lease.
Understandably, the indefinite realities of the language, “and as long
thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities,” should worry
landowners after Jedlicka. Consequently, a landowner ought to
negotiate for a definite term of a lease, or negotiate reparation
procedures should the production go unfavorably in the eyes of the
lessor. While an oil and gas company would prefer an indefinite and
ongoing lease, the company's desire for more holdings may make
definite terms a reality. Ironically, the pro-business imports of Jedlicka
may shift future leases toward more definite terms as landowners
become more sophisticated in negotiating with oil and gas companies.
More definite terms will only become a reality if landowners consult
attorneys and negotiate for their interests.
CONCLUSION
Hydraulic fracturing is a contentious industry practice with many
legitimate environmental concerns.175 Understandably, landowners may
disapprove of hydraulic fracturing and want to protect their land from
potential pollution. Even still, landowners have entered into binding
contracts with oil and gas companies for the joint purpose of making
money from hard-to-reach resources. To gain the financial benefits of
natural gas, occasional environmental risks are signed away; however,
this should not be for an indefinite term. When the joint purposes of an
oil and gas lease are ignored an oil and gas lease should be terminable.
The term in paying quantities should therefore be read with reference to
the good faith of all the parties and interests of an oil and gas lease. The
reasonably prudent operator standard more appropriately balances the
many interests. Under the reasonably prudent operator standard, a
landowner may only terminate a lease if oil and gas is not objectively
being produced in paying quantities and production is not continuing for
purely speculative purposes. Jedlicka ignored landowners’ interests and
eliminated lessors’ ability to terminate a harmful or purely speculative
lease.
Most oil and gas leases contain the indefinite duration of as long
thereafter as oil and gas are produced in paying quantities. 176 Courts in
other states such as Texas, as seen in Koontz, have implemented a
175. See generally H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 24.
176. The exact order of the wording may differ, but habendum clauses containing an
indefinite term such as this are common.
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reasonably prudent operator standard to fill the gap left open in the
Young test. Under the Jedlicka decision, there is no need to weigh the
objective balance between the profits paid by a well and the operating
expenses needed to raise that profit because the burden of proof under
Jedlicka is so extreme. 177 Jedlicka does not necessitate that the
subjective test only be used in the case of a marginal well, but rather the
good faith of the lessee is the only important factor in judging whether a
well is producing in paying quantities.178 As such, unless a landowner is
capable of proving bad faith on the part of the lessee, an oil and gas lease
will continue indefinitely at the whim of a lessee. While protecting oil
and gas corporations from arbitrary jury decisions, the good faith
business judgment standard goes too far in eliminating landowners’
opportunities for relief.
Joseph R. Plukas ∗

177. Compare Young v. Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121, 122-23 (Pa. 1899) (“[I]f a well,
being down, pays a profit,—even a small one, over the operating expenses,—it is producing in
‘paying quantities' . . . .”), with T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 272 (Pa.
2012) (“[I]n assessing whether a lease is producing in paying quantities, Young places the
principal focus on the good faith judgment of the operator.”).
178. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 277 (“As explained above, pursuant to Young, the operator's
good faith judgment is the principal focus in determining whether a lease has produced in
paying quantities.”).
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